AFSPA and the Manipur Crisis: A Law That Won't Die and a State That Won't Heal
AFSPA and the Manipur Crisis: A Law That Won't Die and a State That Won't Heal
What AFSPA Actually Says — and Why It Matters
The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act was passed by Parliament on September 11, 1958. It was introduced in response to Naga insurgency in what was then Assam. Its language is brief, spare, and devastating in its reach.
Under AFSPA, in any area declared "disturbed" by the Central or a state government, an officer of the armed forces — down to the rank of a non-commissioned officer — is empowered to:
- Use force, including lethal force, against any person acting in contravention of any law or order, after giving a warning
- Arrest any person without a warrant on the basis of reasonable suspicion
- Enter and search any premises without a warrant
- Destroy any structure used as a hideout, training camp, or arms dump
- Stop and search any vehicle or vessel
And crucially, Section 6 of the Act grants near-complete immunity: no prosecution, suit, or other legal proceedings shall be instituted against any person in respect of anything done in exercise of these powers except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. In practice, this sanction is almost never given. In the decades since AFSPA came into force, no member of the armed forces has been successfully prosecuted for human rights violations in Northeast India under AFSPA's shelter.
"The Act is a symbol of hate, oppression and instrument of high-handedness. It should be repealed without any reservation."
— Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Chairman, Review Committee on AFSPA, 2005
That report — commissioned by the Central Government itself — recommended repeal nearly 20 years ago. The recommendation was rejected. AFSPA remains.
The Geography of a Divided Law
AFSPA is not uniformly applied across India's Northeast. Over the decades, as insurgencies have wound down or peace processes have taken hold, the law has been progressively withdrawn from some areas. Understanding where it remains tells you something about what India's security establishment believes about each state:
| State / Region | AFSPA Status (2026) | When Withdrawn / Status Change |
|---|---|---|
| Mizoram | Withdrawn | 1986 — after Mizo Peace Accord |
| Tripura | Withdrawn | 2015 — after significant decline in insurgency |
| Meghalaya | Withdrawn | 2018 — peaceful enough for removal |
| Manipur (Imphal Valley, part) | Partially withdrawn, then reimposed | Gradually withdrawn 2004–2023, then reimposed after May 2023 violence |
| Nagaland | In force | Extended continuously; six-monthly renewals ongoing |
| Assam | In force (parts) | Applicable in districts with ongoing insurgency activity |
| Arunachal Pradesh | In force (border districts) | Tirap, Changlang, Longding and adjacent areas |
| Jammu & Kashmir | In force (entire UT) | Since 1990; ongoing |
The pattern of Manipur is particularly instructive. Between 2022 and 2023, in a moment of relative calm, the government had withdrawn AFSPA from 19 police station areas — a sign of confidence that the security situation was improving. Then May 3, 2023 happened. And the law came back.
What Happened on May 3, 2023 — and Why
The immediate trigger was a court order. On April 14, 2023, the Manipur High Court passed an order that appeared to recommend that the Meitei community — the majority community that lives in the Imphal Valley and constitutes about 53% of Manipur's population — be considered for Scheduled Tribe status.
For the Kuki-Zo tribal communities of the hills, this was an existential threat. Scheduled Tribe status carries with it certain constitutional protections: priority in government jobs and educational institutions, and critically, the right to own land in hill areas which are otherwise restricted to tribal members. If the dominant Meitei community — already politically powerful, already controlling the state administration — also gained Scheduled Tribe status, the Kuki-Zo feared that the last protections over their land and livelihoods would be stripped away.
On May 3, tribal solidarity marches erupted across the hill districts. Counter-rallies erupted in the valley. Before the day was over, Manipur was on fire.
The State's Role: What the Evidence Shows
The Manipur state government, led by then Chief Minister N. Biren Singh until his resignation in February 2025, has been the subject of intense and documented scrutiny. Several elements of the state's conduct during the crisis have been placed on record — not by opposition politicians, but by the Supreme Court of India, international human rights organisations, and independent journalists.
Among the documented elements:
- The forest eviction drive against Kuki communities in the months before violence erupted, which displaced hill villagers and heightened tensions
- The withdrawal of the Suspension of Operations agreement with Kuki militant groups, removing a negotiated peace framework that had held for 15 years
- An internet blackout imposed during the most intense period of killing, which prevented documentation and accountability in real time
- The deployment of a state police force that multiple investigations found had institutional bias toward the Meitei community, with documented cases where police either stood by or participated in violence against Kuki-Zo people
- Audio recordings submitted to the Supreme Court by a Kuki civil society body, in which a voice identified as the Chief Minister's claims he personally encouraged the burning of Kuki villages
In the 2024 general election, the BJP — Singh's party — lost both parliamentary seats in Manipur to the Congress. The results were widely interpreted as a direct popular verdict on his handling of the crisis. By November 2024, his coalition partner had withdrawn support. He resigned on February 9, 2025. President's Rule was imposed. And on February 4, 2026, a new BJP Chief Minister — Yumnam Khemchand Singh — was sworn in, ending President's Rule.
The conflict has not ended. It has paused in some places and continues in others.
AFSPA and Manipur: The Circular Trap
Here is the central irony that the Manipur crisis throws into sharp relief. AFSPA is justified as a tool needed to manage violent, unstable areas. But in Manipur, the conditions that AFSPA was supposed to address — ethnic tension, communal violence, breakdown of civil order — have in significant part been produced by decades of AFSPA-era governance. When the armed forces operate with near-total legal immunity for years on end, the accountability structures that might prevent abuses, build community trust, and de-escalate tensions are systematically undermined.
Irom Sharmila understood this. Her 16-year hunger strike — which I wrote about in 2011 and which ended in 2016 — was not simply a protest against a law. It was a protest against the idea that communities could be governed through military exceptionalism for decades and somehow emerge healthy. She was right. They cannot.
The current crisis in Manipur is not unrelated to AFSPA's history in the state. The proliferation of armed groups on both sides draws on a political culture shaped by 40 years of militarised governance. The weakness of civil policing — which created the vacuum that armed forces fill — is partly a consequence of decades in which the army, not the police, was the primary security actor. The impunity with which state-aligned militias operated in 2023 mirrors the impunity that AFSPA extended to armed forces throughout the preceding decades.
"AFSPA became a symbol of oppression in the areas it was enacted. The status quo is no longer the acceptable solution."
— Second Administrative Reforms Commission, Government of India, 2007
That was the government's own Commission speaking — in 2007. Nearly 20 years later, the status quo has been not just maintained but expanded in Manipur in response to the crisis of 2023.
The Committees That Spoke and Were Ignored
It is important to record these clearly, because each one represents a moment where India had the opportunity to choose a different path:
| Committee / Body | Year | Recommendation | Government Response |
|---|---|---|---|
| Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy Committee | 2005 | Repeal AFSPA entirely; incorporate necessary provisions into UAPA | Recommendation rejected in 2015 |
| Second Administrative Reforms Commission | 2007 | Repeal AFSPA; replace with humane legal framework | Not acted upon |
| Justice J.S. Verma Committee | 2013 | Armed forces officers who commit sexual violence should be tried under ordinary criminal law, not AFSPA's protection | Not implemented |
| Supreme Court of India | 2016 | Every use of force under AFSPA must be subject to judicial scrutiny; Act must be reviewed every six months with states | Review process formalised, but accountability outcomes remain minimal |
| Supreme Court of India | 2023–25 | Expressed concern over "absolute breakdown of law and order" in Manipur; dispatched six judges to assess ground situation; ordered investigation into sexual violence cases | Ongoing; prosecutions remain sparse |
What Happens Now — The Question Nobody Is Answering
With a new Chief Minister installed in Imphal in February 2026 and President's Rule revoked, the political theatre suggests normalcy. On the ground, the situation is more sobering. The buffer zones between communities remain. The 60,000 displaced persons remain displaced — many still in relief camps documented as overcrowded, undersupplied, and without rehabilitation plans. The weapons looted from police armouries have not been fully recovered. The armed militias on both sides have not been disarmed. No senior perpetrator of violence — from either community, but especially from the Meitei militias with documented state links — has been successfully prosecuted.
AFSPA remains in force in the hill districts. The Supreme Court continues to monitor. Civil society on both sides of the ethnic divide continues to document. And the Indian Parliament — which has not had a substantive debate on Manipur's crisis proportionate to its severity — has largely moved on to other news cycles.
A Personal Note: From 2011 to 2026
This is a developing situation. BUGLE will continue to follow the Manipur crisis and AFSPA through 2026.
If you found this post useful, share it — especially with people outside Northeast India who may not be following this story. The less this is discussed in mainstream India, the longer it will take for anything to change. Comments are open below.
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