Armed Groups in Northeast India — A Plain-Language Guide to Who They Are, What They Want, and Why They Still Exist
Armed Groups in Northeast India — A Plain-Language Guide to Who They Are, What They Want, and Why They Still Exist
What is in this guide
- Why armed groups exist in Northeast India — the structural reasons
- The Naga groups — NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, and their factions
- The Assam groups — ULFA and its split
- The Manipur groups — the most complex landscape
- Bodoland and Tripura groups
- The Myanmar connection — why most groups base there
- How they fund themselves — extortion explained
- Why the insurgency is declining — but not ending
- UPSC key points
- FAQ
Why Armed Groups Exist in Northeast India — The Structural Reasons
Northeast India's armed insurgencies are among the world's longest-running. To understand them, you need to understand the structural conditions that produced and have sustained them — not just the individual groups.
1. The merger question was never fully settled. Several Northeast territories joined India not through popular referendum but through negotiated accords, in some cases under disputed circumstances. Manipur's Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession in September 1949, a decision some Meitei nationalists have contested ever since. The Nagas declared independence on August 14, 1947 — the day before India's independence — and never voted to join India. These historical grievances, whether or not they are legally sound, have provided the foundational narrative for armed movements.
2. Geography enables insurgency. The region shares international borders with five countries — China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan. The India-Myanmar border stretches over 1,600 km, much of it through dense jungle and hill terrain with no fencing (until recently — fencing is now underway, and is itself a source of conflict with local communities and armed groups). Insurgents have historically used Myanmar as a base, a transit route, and an arms source.
3. Economic underdevelopment creates recruits. The combination of poor infrastructure, limited private sector employment, educated but unemployed young people, and the relatively easy access to weapons has historically made armed group membership an economically rational choice for some. Monthly stipends paid by insurgent groups — funded by extortion — have often exceeded what legitimate employment offers.
4. Fragmentation multiplies groups. Once an armed group forms, internal disagreements about tactics, leadership, and the terms of any peace deal routinely split it into factions. Each faction then has an independent organisational interest in continued existence. NSCN alone has split into at least five factions. ULFA split into a "pro-talks" faction and an "anti-talks" (Independent) faction in 2008. The NDFB split into multiple factions. Fragmentation makes peace harder to achieve because any deal must satisfy multiple groups with divergent interests.
The Naga Groups — NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, and Their Factions
NSCN-IM — National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah)
Ceasefire since 1997The most politically significant Naga armed group and the primary party in the ongoing Naga peace talks. In ceasefire since 1997 and a Framework Agreement since 2015. Peace talks have stalled over two irresolvable demands: NSCN-IM insists on a separate Naga flag and a separate Naga constitution as part of any final settlement — demands the Indian government has not accepted. The IM has maintained armed presence and organisational structure throughout the ceasefire, using the talks period to consolidate political influence in Nagaland and Manipur's Naga hill districts. As of June 2026, no final settlement has been reached despite talks lasting 30 years.
NSCN-K and its factions — Khaplang, then Yung Aung
Active (anti-India operations resumed 2015)After founding leader S.S. Khaplang abrogated the ceasefire with India in 2015 — reportedly under Chinese influence — NSCN-K resumed attacks on Indian security forces. After Khaplang's death in 2017, the group split further. The Yung Aung faction (NSCN-K-YA) is the most active anti-India faction operating from Myanmar bases. In January 2026, NSCN-K-YA attacked an Assam Rifles camp near Changlang. On March 26, 2026, NSCN-K-YA militants killed three Assam Rifles personnel in Arunachal Pradesh, claiming retaliation for India's border fencing operations along the Myanmar border. India confirmed in January 2026 that Indian forces had conducted drone strikes on NSCN-K-YA and ULFA-I camps in Myanmar in late 2025.
NSCN-KK (Khole-Kitovi) and other factions
CeasefireThe NNPGs — seven smaller Naga groups including NSCN-KK — have pursued a separate negotiating track from NSCN-IM, signing a "Agreed Position" with the Indian government in 2017. They have been more accommodating on the flag and constitution questions, which has complicated the peace process by creating a split between NSCN-IM and the NNPGs.
The Assam Groups — ULFA and Its Split
ULFA — United Liberation Front of Asom
Pro-talks faction: Peace accord December 2023 ULFA-I: Still activeULFA was for three decades the most powerful armed group in Assam — a cadre-based organisation with thousands of fighters, a sophisticated extortion network targeting tea estates, oil companies, and businesses, and bases in Bhutan and Myanmar. It killed hundreds in bomb attacks targeting Hindi-speaking migrant workers in the 1990s and 2000s. ULFA split in 2008 over whether to enter peace talks. The pro-talks faction, led by Arabinda Rajkhowa, signed a peace accord with the Indian government in December 2023 — ending 44 years of armed rebellion. ULFA-I, led by Paresh Baruah from bases near the China-Myanmar border, rejected the accord and continues to operate. SATP data recorded only limited ULFA-I activity in Assam in 2025, with five insurgency-related deaths in the state — reflecting a dramatically weakened operational capacity compared to the 1990s peak.
KLO — Kamtapur Liberation Organisation
Active (reduced)Demands a separate state called Kamtapur for the Koch Rajbongshi people straddling the Assam-West Bengal border. Has had operational links with ULFA and Pakistani intelligence (ISI) in its history. Significantly weakened but not disbanded.
The Manipur Groups — The Most Complex Landscape
Manipur has the highest concentration of armed groups of any Northeast state — a reflection of its extreme ethnic diversity and the long history of demands from multiple communities for separate governance arrangements.
Meitei armed groups — CorCom and its constituents
ActiveThe CorCom groups are Meitei armed organisations — the same community that is the majority in the Imphal Valley. They are distinctly different from the Meitei civilian militias (Arambai Tenggol, Meitei Leepun) involved in the 2023 ethnic violence, which are not designated armed groups but rather civil society bodies that became involved in violence. CorCom groups demand independence from India, base themselves in Myanmar, and carry out occasional bombings and extortion in Manipur. Their operational capacity in 2026 is a fraction of what it was in the 2000s. They have adopted the WESEA (Western South East Asia) framing — arguing that Manipur's "liberation" is part of a broader regional decolonisation movement.
Kuki armed groups — under Suspension of Operations
SoO (Suspension of Operations)Several Kuki armed groups had been under "Suspension of Operations" agreements with the government — a Manipur-specific arrangement where groups agree to stop armed activities and confine cadres to designated camps in exchange for stipends and recognition in peace talks. In March 2023, shortly before the May 3 violence erupted, the Manipur government unilaterally cancelled the SoO arrangement with some Kuki groups — a move Kuki civil society characterised as deliberate destabilisation. The removal of the restraint on Kuki armed groups, combined with the simultaneous arming of Meitei communities through looted police armouries, contributed to the scale of the subsequent violence.
Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun — not insurgents, but armed
Active — not designated terrorist organisationsThese are not armed insurgent groups in the traditional sense — they do not seek independence from India. Arambai Tenggol presents itself as a cultural organisation defending Meitei Hindu identity. However, Human Rights Watch and Indian Army intelligence have documented their armed role in the 2023 violence, including the training of civilian mobs with looted military weapons. These groups operated with documented impunity during the first phase of the conflict. They are important for understanding the 2023 Manipur violence but are categorically different from the insurgent groups listed above.
Bodoland and Tripura Groups
NDFB — National Democratic Front of Bodoland
Largely resolved — 2020 Bodo AccordThe NDFB was one of Assam's most violent armed groups in its peak years — responsible for multiple mass killings including the 2014 Kokrajhar attacks that killed 81 people. The group split into multiple factions over decades of internal disagreements. The 2020 Bodo Accord brought all NDFB factions into a peace framework, with the creation of an expanded Bodoland Territorial Region and a ₹1,500 crore development package. Over 1,500 cadres were rehabilitated. The NDFB is the most successful recent example of insurgency resolution through a political-economic package.
ATTF and NLFT — Tripura groups
Largely resolvedTripura's insurgency arose from the state's dramatic demographic transformation — indigenous tribal peoples became a minority in their own state due to massive Bengali migration from erstwhile East Pakistan and then Bangladesh. The ATTF and NLFT conducted violent attacks targeting Bengali settlers. Bangladeshi security cooperation after 2009, combined with India's diplomatic pressure, significantly degraded both groups' capacity. Tripura is now considered one of the Northeast's most peaceful states.
The Myanmar Connection — Why Most Groups Base There
The single most important external factor in Northeast India's insurgency is Myanmar. Understanding the Myanmar connection is essential — and it explains why India's border management strategy and its response to Myanmar's civil war matter so much for Northeast security.
From the 1980s onward, virtually every major Northeast Indian armed group established bases in Myanmar's Sagaing Region — the hill territory across India's eastern border with Manipur and Nagaland. This happened for several reasons:
- The Sagaing hills were controlled by Naga and Kachin armed groups who were sympathetic to Indian insurgents and willing to provide territory, training, and arms in exchange for money and political solidarity
- Myanmar's military (Tatmadaw) historically tolerated Indian insurgents in return for financial payments and a tacit agreement that the Indian groups would not attack Burmese interests
- China provided training and arms to multiple groups — NSCN, ULFA, and PLA-Manipur — particularly in the 1980s when these groups were actively fighting the Indian state
- Myanmar offered a legal and operational buffer: Indian security forces could not legally pursue insurgents across the international border
Since 2021, Myanmar's civil war has complicated this arrangement. The Tatmadaw's capacity to police the border has declined. Anti-junta resistance groups now control large parts of Sagaing. Indian armed groups face a more chaotic and unpredictable operating environment in Myanmar — but also potentially new alliances and arms sources through the conflict's proliferated weapons.
How They Fund Themselves — Extortion Explained
One of the most poorly understood aspects of Northeast insurgency is how armed groups sustain themselves financially. They are not primarily funded by foreign states (though some have received arms and training from China). The primary revenue source is systematic extortion — locally called "taxation" — of businesses, government contractors, civil servants, and ordinary citizens.
The extortion system works like this:
- Every business operating in a group's claimed territory pays a monthly or annual "tax" to the group. Tea estates, oil companies, timber merchants, and construction contractors have paid ULFA, NSCN, and Meitei groups for decades.
- Government contractors building roads, bridges, or buildings must pay a percentage — typically 10–15% — of the contract value to the local armed group to be allowed to work without interference.
- Central government employees, teachers, and bureaucrats may be required to pay a portion of their salary. In peak ULFA years, this was systematically enforced across much of Assam.
- Kidnapping for ransom of businesspeople and government officials has been used by multiple groups historically, though this has declined as groups have weakened.
This extortion economy has two consequences that are rarely discussed. First, it creates vested interests in the continuation of the insurgency — both within the armed groups (whose leadership derives income and status from it) and among complicit politicians and contractors who find the arrangement economically convenient. Second, it raises the cost of doing legitimate business in the region, suppressing investment and employment — which in turn perpetuates the economic conditions that make armed group recruitment possible.
Why the Insurgency Is Declining — But Not Ending
The Northeast insurgency is in long-term structural decline. SATP data for 2025 recorded no insurgency-related fatalities in Nagaland, five in Assam, and declining figures across most other states. The Mizo insurgency ended in 1986 and has not resumed. ULFA signed a peace accord in 2023. The Bodo groups signed in 2020. The Karbi Anglong insurgency was resolved in 2021. This is genuine progress.
Several factors are driving the decline:
- Bangladesh's cooperation. After the Awami League government under Sheikh Hasina came to power, Bangladesh cracked down on ULFA camps on its territory and extradited senior leaders — directly degrading ULFA's operational capacity.
- Bhutan's 2003 Operation All Clear. Bhutan expelled Indian insurgent groups from its territory in 2003, destroying camps that had been operational for over a decade.
- India-Myanmar cooperation. Though complicated by Myanmar's civil war, India and Myanmar conducted joint operations (Operation Sunrise I and II in 2019) that degraded several armed groups' bases.
- Development investment. Infrastructure — road, rail, internet, electricity — has improved living standards and expanded economic opportunity in ways that reduce armed group recruitment.
- Factional exhaustion. Decades of internal splits, inter-group violence, and declining ideological credibility have sapped many groups' ability to recruit and retain cadres.
UPSC Key Points
For Prelims — key facts
- NSCN-IM ceasefire: 1997; Framework Agreement: 2015; demand: Naga flag + constitution (peace talks stalled)
- NSCN-K-YA: abrogated ceasefire 2015; killed 3 Assam Rifles personnel March 2026; based in Myanmar
- ULFA founded: April 7, 1979
- ULFA split: 2008 — pro-talks faction vs ULFA-Independent (Paresh Baruah)
- ULFA pro-talks peace accord: December 2023
- India drone strikes in Myanmar: confirmed January 2026 — first publicly confirmed cross-border offensive strikes
- CorCom: Coordination Committee — umbrella for Meitei armed groups in Manipur; formed 2011
- WESEA: Western South East Asia — framing used by CorCom and ULFA-I for their combined independence movement
- UNLFW: United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia — formed 2015 by NSCN-K, ULFA, others
- NDFB: resolved under 2020 Bodo Accord; 1,500+ cadres rehabilitated; ₹1,500 crore development package
- SoO: Suspension of Operations — agreement under which groups confine cadres to camps; distinct from ceasefire
- Tripura insurgency: largely resolved; Bangladesh cooperation and Tripura Tribal Areas ADC key factors
- Mizo insurgency: resolved 1986 Mizo Accord — benchmark successful peace deal in Northeast India
- Operation All Clear: Bhutan 2003 — expelled Indian insurgent camps from Bhutanese territory
- Operation Sunrise I and II: 2019 — India-Myanmar joint operations against armed group bases
For Mains — analytical framework
- Causes framework: Historical merger grievances + geography (porous borders) + economic underdevelopment + ethnic diversity + external support (Myanmar, historical China)
- Why fragmentation matters: Each split creates a new group with independent incentive to continue; peace deals must address multiple factions simultaneously
- Revenue model: Extortion as primary funding — "taxation" of businesses, contractors, government employees; creates structural interest in insurgency continuation
- Decline factors: Bangladesh cooperation, Bhutan expulsion (2003), improved development, factional exhaustion, India-Myanmar operations
- Persistent factors: NSCN-IM unresolved, Kuki reactivation post-2023, ULFA-I Myanmar bases, NSCN-K-YA attacks, Myanmar civil war complicating border management
- 2026 additions: India drone strikes (confirmed), Manipur conflict reactivating old armed dynamics, Myanmar border fencing triggering NSCN-K-YA attacks
- Best peace model: Mizo Accord (1986) — total surrender of arms, political rehabilitation, immediate statehood for insurgent leaders. Compare with ongoing Naga talks (30 years, no resolution).
FAQ
Are the armed groups in Manipur's 2023 conflict the same as the traditional insurgent groups?
No — and this distinction matters significantly. The traditional Meitei insurgent groups (UNLF, PLA, PREPAK) in CorCom seek independence from India and are based in Myanmar. The Kuki armed groups in SoO camps had agreed to suspend operations. What drove the 2023 Manipur violence was primarily civilian mobilisation — armed mobs from the Meitei community, some trained by members of Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun, and Kuki communities that armed themselves in self-defence. The Indian Army assessed that approximately 100 active cadres of Valley-Based Insurgent Groups had crossed from Myanmar to fight on the Meitei side. So traditional insurgents were involved, but they were not the primary driver of the violence.
What is the "flag and constitution" issue that has blocked the Naga peace talks?
NSCN-IM has insisted, as a condition of any final peace settlement, that a Naga political entity should have its own distinct flag and its own constitution — symbols of nationhood rather than just administrative autonomy. The Indian government's position is that flags and constitutions are sovereign symbols reserved for the Indian nation-state, and that no state or autonomous region within India can have its own separate flag and constitution. Neither side has moved from this position in three decades. This is the specific deadlock that has prevented the Framework Agreement of 2015 from becoming a final peace accord.
Does China support Northeast Indian insurgents?
Historically, yes — significantly. China provided arms, training, and bases to NSCN, ULFA, PLA-Manipur and other groups through the 1980s and into the 1990s, primarily routed through the Kachin Independence Organisation in Myanmar. This was part of China's broader Cold War-era strategy of supporting insurgencies in neighbouring countries. Chinese active support declined significantly after the 1990s as China-India relations normalised and China's strategic interests shifted. NSCN-K's abrogation of its ceasefire with India in 2015 was reportedly influenced by Chinese officials — suggesting continued if more discreet Chinese interest in the regional insurgency landscape. Indian intelligence and security analysts continue to monitor the China connection, particularly for NSCN-K-YA operating from areas near the China-Myanmar border.
Part of BUGLE's Northeast India series. Related: Meitei vs Kuki-Zo — The Manipur Conflict Explained | The Nagaland Peace Talks — 30 Years, Still No Accord | AFSPA and the Manipur Crisis | The Assam Accord 1985 and the NRC
Working on Northeast security issues — as a researcher, journalist, NGO worker, or concerned citizen? BUGLE has been tracking this since 2008. Drop a comment with corrections, updates, or ground-level information.
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